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Abstract 
Employing data from 13 Latin American countries, we find that greater central bank 
independence is associated with lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market, and 
also with leaning-against-the-wind intervention.  We also find that the structural reforms 
that occurred in Latin America mostly in the 1990s helped to reduce the need for 
foreign exchange intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
Central bank independence to conduct monetary policy has been related to low inflation 
rates with no consequences to economic growth (Grilli et al., 1991; Alesina and 
Summers, 1993; Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger and Haan, 1996; Jacome, 2001; Jacome 
and Vasquez, 2005).  Heightened independence can also be associated with lesser 
intervention in the foreign exchange market.  Indeed a negative relationship between 
foreign exchange intervention and central bank independence has been found for 20 
industrialized countries (Almekinders, 1995) in a study that employed both changes in 
currency reserves as proxies for intervention and the central bank independence index of 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993).  The negative relationship also holds for the variability 
of intervention and independence.  (Foreign exchange intervention surveys include 
Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Taylor (2004).)  So the relationship between foreign 
exchange intervention and central bank independence will be our concern in this paper.  
We will taka data from Latin American countries and put forward an alternative 
methodology. 
The usage of changes in reserves to proxy for intervention activity can be 
criticized on the basis that they are too noisy and that reserves can change for reasons 
having nothing to do with intervention.  For instance, if the currency of a country 
depreciates, this will automatically increase the relative value of any foreign exchange 
holdings in a central bank’s portfolio.  In such a situation the positive correlation 
between intervention (proxied by reserve changes) and lack of central bank 
independence could be explained by the fact that countries with lesser independent 
central banks have more expansionary (and variable) monetary policy, which in turn 
leads to a more depreciating (and volatile) exchange rate, and therefore to larger (and 
more variable) foreign reserves. 
Rather than relying on net foreign reserves, here we will take the policy rule 
( ) ( )ln ln 1Tt ti Rφ= −                                                                                             (1) 
to track intervention.  In equation (1), iT is the target to the nominal interest rate.  
Departures of the nominal exchange rate from its target are captured by the deviations 
of real exchange rate R from its PPP value of one.  Equation (1) can be justified on the 
basis that a central bank’s main concern in intervention activity is to counteract 
speculative nominal exchange rate changes. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will present data.  
Section 3 will analyze the data.  Section 4 will conclude. 
 
2. Data 
We consider 13 countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, and take monthly data on nominal interest rates, nominal exchange rates, 
and price levels over the period January 1990−December 2003 (the only available) from 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  The central bank (legal) independence index 
employed is that of Jacome and Vasquez (2005).  This index takes into account not only 
economic and political sovereignty (as in Cukierman, 1992) but also financial 
sovereignty, responsibility, transparency, and the role of the central bank as a lender in 
the last resort. 
 
3. Analysis 
Latin American countries recently pursued more central bank independence through 
major reforms, most noticeably in Argentina (1992 and 2002), Bolivia (1995), Chile 
(1989), Colombia (1992), Costa Rica (1995), Mexico (1993), Paraguay (1995), Peru 
(1993), Uruguay (1995), and Venezuela (1992 and 2001).  Table 1 shows the countries’ 
central bank intervention index taking into account those reforms.  Reform countries are 
indicated with either “0” (pre-reform subperiod) or “1” (post-reform subperiod).  We 
assessed the relationship between central bank independence and intervention 
employing both individual country estimation (Table 2) and cross-country estimation 
through panel data (Table 3). 
Policy rule (1) was used to proxy for intervention in individual country 
estimation.  The intervention coefficients employed were obtained by individually 
estimating (via OLS) equation (1) for every country (Table 2).  In Table 2, ∆ is a series’ 
first differences in natural logs, and D is the deviation of the real exchange rate from the 
PPP value of one.  Estimates in the regressions of Table 2 were backed by standard 
econometric treatment.  To preventing spourious regressions, ADF and Phillips-Perron 
tests were employed in order to check for stationarity.  We also run a CUSUM test to 
check for parameter stability.  Moreover, whenever autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in residuals were detected, they were fixed through Newey-West 
correction. 
That leaning against the wind is the usual type of intervention can be seen in the 
negative sign of the deviations of the real exchange rate from its PPP value of one in the 
regressions for Argentina (1), Bolivia (1), Brazil, Chile, Colombia (0 and 1), Paraguay 
(1), Peru, and Venezuela (0 and 1) (Table 2).  The positive sign of the regressions in 
Table 2 refers to the countries with leaning-with-the-wind intervention. 
Countries experiencing crises over the period were Argentina (2002), Colombia 
(1998−1999), Dominican Republic (2002−2003), Mexico (1995), Uruguay (2002), and 
Venezuela (1994−1995).  For these countries we considered banking crisis dummies.  
But these alone can lead to an omitted variable bias because the central bank reforms 
after the crises were usually part of broader structural reforms that included 
privatizations, trade reform, and other structural macro policies (Jacome and Vasquez, 
2005).  To circumvent this bias, we considered the index of structural reform of the 
Inter-American Development Bank as an extra control variable (Lora, 2001; Lora and 
Panizza, 2002). 
The four panels in Table 3 show a negative relationship between the foreign 
exchange intervention coefficient and the central bank independence index over the 
period 1990−2003.  The coefficients were estimated by feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) and robust coefficient covariances (White robust covariances), allowing 
for heteroscedasticity across countries and computing White-type robust standard errors, 
together with an AR(1) autocorrelation structure, and with a ρ coefficient common to all 
countries. 
Regression [1] considered only the central bank index, regression [2] added the 
structural reform index, and regression [3] added the banking crisis dummy.  Regression 
[4] took all those into account.  Apart from the dummy for banking crisis, Table 3 
shows that the variables were related at a significance level of up 10 percent.  Thus the 
proposition that increased central bank independence can be associated with lesser 
intervention in foreign exchange markets holds for Latin America.  Also, the structural 
reforms helped to reduce the need for foreign exchange intervention.  The banking 
crises did not matter for intervention, however.  Indeed the R2 in regression [3] suggests 
that nearly 79 percent of the changes occurring in the intervention coefficient can be 
explained solely by the independence and structural reform indices. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The experience of 13 Latin American countries suggests that greater central bank 
independence can be associated with both (1) lesser intervention in the foreign exchange 
market and (2) leaning-against-the-wind intervention.  These findings are in accordance 
with previous ones for industrialized countries.  However, such studies relied on OLS 
cross-country regressions and foreign reserves as a proxy for intervention.  Rather than 
using reserves, we assessed the relationship between central bank independence and 
intervention employing both individual-country estimation (via a policy rule) and cross-
country estimation through panel data.  Incidentally, we also found that the structural 
reforms that occurred in Latin America helped to reduce the need for foreign exchange 
intervention. 
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Table 1.  Latin American central bank 
independence and reform 
 
 Time Period CBII 
Group 1  0.84 
ARG−1 1993−2003  
BOL−1 1996−2003  
CHI 1990−2002  
COL−1 1993−2003  
MEX−1 1994−2003  
PER−1 1994−2003  
   
Group 2  0.70 
CRC−1 1996−2003  
PAR−1 1996−2003  
URU−1 1996−2003  
VEN−1 1993−2003  
   
Group 3  0.44 
ARG−0 1990−1992  
BOL−0 1990−1995  
BRA 1990−2003  
COL−0 1990−1992  
CRC−0 1990−1995  
GUA 1990−2003  
DOM 1990−2003  
MEX−0 1990−1993  
PAR−0 1990−1995  
PER−0 1990−1993  
URU−0 1990−1995  
VEN−0 1990−1992  
Note 
Reform countries are indicated with either “0” 
(pre-reform subperiod) or “1” (post-reform 
subperiod) 
CBII is the central bank independence index 
Source: Jacome and Vasquez (2005)  
Table 2. Individual country regressions using policy rule (1) 
 
∆iT    =  1.3621* ∆D                              Adjusted R2 = 0.45                                  (ARG−0)   
            (8.75)          
 
lniT  = −0.18* lnD                                Adjusted R2 = 0.03                                  (ARG−1)   
            (−3.65) 
 
lniT =  0.006* + 0.805* lnD                 Adjusted R2 = 0.24                                  (BOL−0)   
           (2.45)     (2.58)     
 
lniT  = −0.050* lnD                              Adjusted R2 = 0.02                                  (BOL−1)   
             (−3.50) 
 
lniT  = 1.336* − 0.0512* lnD               Adjusted R2 = 0.03                                   (BRA)   
          (7.54)      (–2.73)    
 
              
lniT  = 1.456* − 0.216* lnD                 Adjusted R2 = 0.33                                   (CHI)   
         (11.24)     (–10.6)    
 
 
∆iT    =  0.02*  + 0.048* ∆D                 Adjusted R2 = 0.14                                   (COL−0)   
           (2.72)     (2.29)     
 
lniT  = 0.404* − 0.238* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.77                                   (COL−1)   
           (26.03)   (−13.42) 
 
∆iT    = 0.51* ∆D                                  Adjusted R2 = 0.17                                   (CRC−0)   
          (2.43)          
 
lniT  = −0.05* lnD                               Adjusted R2 = 0.13                                   (CRC−1)   
             (−4.18) 
 
∆iT    =  −0.38*  + 0.155* ∆D               Adjusted R2 = 0.46                                       (DOM)   
         (−6.43)      (9.12)      
 
    
∆iT    =  0.116* ∆D                               Adjusted R2 = 0.06                                       (GUA)   
           (6.52)      
 
 
lniT =  −1.44* + 0.675* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.65                                  (MEX−0)   
           (−3.35)     (3.84)     
 
lniT  = −1.22* + 0.599* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.71                                  (MEX−1)   
             (−8.62)  (9.78)                                  
 
lniT =  0.019* lnD                               Adjusted R2 = 0.005                                 (PAR−0)   
           (12.3)     
 
lniT  = −1.33* ∆D                               Adjusted R2 = 0.71                                   (PAR−1)   
             (−3.54)         
 
lniT =  0.807* lnD                               Adjusted R2 = 0.003                                 (PER−0)   
           (3.67)     
 
lniT  = 0.435* − 0.265* lnD                Adjusted R2 = 0.19                                   (PER−1)   
            (4.75)    (−3.10) 
 
∆iT   =  1.443* ∆D                                Adjusted R2 = 0.41                                   (URU−0)   
           (6.80)          
 
∆iT   =  0.369* ∆D                                Adjusted R2 = 0.03                                   (URU−1)   
            (3.43) 
 
lniT =  2.43* − 0.271* lnD                  Adjusted R2 = 0.28                                   (VEN−0)   
          (2.37)    (−2.04)     
 
lniT  = −0.049* lnD                             Adjusted R2 = 0.07                                   (VEN−1)   
             (−26.52) 
Note 
* means significance at 5 percent, figures in brackets show the t-statistic, and D is the deviation of 
   the real exchange rate from the PPP value of one 
Table 3. Panel regressions using feasible generalized least squares 
 
Regression [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant 0.0008*      (66.82) 
0.000* 
      (67.07) 
0.0008* 
   (58.03) 
0.0008* 
     (51.39) 
Central Bank Independence Index −0.199* 
     (−2.53) 
−0.176* 
     (−2.03) 
−20.05* 
   (−2.49) 
−20.06* 
    (−2.48) 
Structural Reform Index  −2.20E
−0.7**
  (−1.76) 
 −0.02** 
    (−2.52) 
Dummy for Banking Crisis   −0.03 
     (−0.75) 
−0.03 
       (−0.75) 
     
R2 0.033 0.79 0.032 0.030 
Observations 2.184 2.184 2.184 2.184 
Number of Countries 13 13 13 13 
ρ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Note 
* means significance at 5 percent, ** means significance at 10 percent, and figures in brackets show 
   the t-statistic 
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